Working on Infiltration Tactics

The days here are numbered (it's down to just 7). I only have one game left that I plan to get in (and hopefully log) over the span of a single day before I head overseas, so I'm really coming down to the wire here. I pulled out my copy of OCS Burma I last week, however, and I have to say, as far as adopting new doctrines, this one sure gave me a heck of a challenge. 

I set up short scenario #4 (which I will revisit in time) and it was readily apparent that my typical skillset for war games would not be compatible with the Japanese position in this scenario, let alone theater. After a careful read of the rules more than once, it's obvious how the Japanese players have to lean into the belligerent's infiltration doctrine if they have any hopes of pulling off a victory. As several "balls-to-the-wall" turns can attest to, my preference for amassing fire doesn't sit well with the options available to the Japanese.

In scenario #4, the Japanese have to stave off efforts by the Commonwealth forces to reopen the road to Imphal, which is cut off from the Allied supply source. Assuming a defensive posture for the Japanese is, I assume after one failed attempt, the stance to take, especially while trying to grasp the challenge of supply. I suppose exceptions, again only as they pertain to this particular scenario, are to be made where the Japanese grasp on the all-weather road to Imphal is at risk of being loosened and a diversionary effort elsewhere in the mountains north of the city needs to be made to retain control of the road. 

The risk of forage is also tricky to navigate and I'll probably try to follow other notes that I can find on how OCS players grapple with the Japanese forces in OCS Burma. 

Early action in the scenario in the Imphal sector -- the only successful banzai cut off elements of the 17th. Efforts to take Imphal by storm, though, were rebuffed.

One of the other issues that I found is that it doesn't seem like the Japanese forces converging on Imphal, at least in this scenario, are best deployed, except for maybe infiltration -- I suppose emphasis on infiltration and skirting around otherwise impassible avenues of attack is great for cutting off supply and forcing defenders to give up ground, but at the cost of otherwise preferable avenues of attack for more direct, obstacle-busting offensive doctrines. If I play this scenario again, for instance, I'll pay the high supply costs of moving the armor early to move them off of the south edge and bring them back on at Hengtam to take the advance along the west side of Logtak Lake instead of east towards Palel where the 20th and 23rd Indian Divisions are better entrenched. If the Japanese 33rd Division can keep the 17th Indians at bay for 3 turns, a combined infiltration-armor assault on Imphal from the SW might apply better pressure on the Indians. 

The attack west of Lake Togtak abandoned.

Of course, I didn't do any of this in my first few turns of this scenario. Instead, I slammed Sato's 31st Division into the relieve force occupying Kohima to Imphal's north which provided little in the way of keeping Imphal cut off. Within 3-4 turns, the road to Imphal was open and I'd lost half of the 31st and 33rd Divisions, primarily to the dogged efforts of the mixed British forces available in the scenario under the British IV Corps HQ, the air force out of Ledo, Cowan's 17th Indian Division, and a blind desire to test out the banzai mechanics. What I will say, though, is that commanding lots of 5 AR battalions is a lot of fun.

Needless to say, I played this a little too quickly, a little too recklessly, and with little concept of how OCS Burma should be played. I don't know when I'll find the time, but I'll be damned if Burma doesn't make it with me over to Heidelberg for the next several years. So, we'll be seeing more of this OCS title in time.